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Gap? What Gap?
On the Unity of Apperception and the Necessary Application of 
the Categories¹
I
In some Anglophone Kant literature (Van Cleve 1999; Gomes 2010; Stephenson 
2014), the problem has been raised of an alleged ‘gap’ in Kant’s argument in  the 
Transcendental Deduction (henceforth ‘the Deduction’) for the necessary applica-
tion of the categories to objects of experience, hereafter called ‘the Gap’.² The Gap 
is construed in terms of the difference between arguing that we must apply catego-
ries in order to be able to think of, experience, or perceive objects and arguing that 
the categories must so apply, or in other words, that the categories are exemplified 
by the objects that we think of, experience, or perceive. The first argument doesn’t 
imply the second one. Kant appears to claim it does. Hence the Gap. 
If this is indeed the case, there is a serious problem with Kant’s claim that by 
means of showing that the categories are derived from the subjective functions of 
thought we are able to tell how knowledge of objects is possible. At most, Kant will 
have shown that there are certain necessary ways in which we think of, experience, 
or perceive objects, but not that the objects of thought, experience, or perception 
necessarily conform to our necessary ways of thinking, experiencing, or perceiv-
1 I thank Robert Hanna, Giuseppe Motta, Christian Onof, Marcel Quarfood, and Scott Stapleford 
for their written comments on a previous draft of this article. I should also like to thank the par-
ticipants in the conference “Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins”, which was held in 
Graz, Austria, in September 2014, in particular Corey Dyck, Heiner Klemme, Camilla Serck-Han-
sen, Thomas Sturm and Falk Wunderlich for their comments on the presentation that formed the 
basis for this article. Lastly, I thank Giuseppe Motta and Udo Thiel for the invitation to present 
the paper at the conference. This paper is a shortened version of Chapter 4 in Schulting 2017a, 
and is reproduced here with the permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
2 In the Kant literature, there are two other, different, discussions about a putative gap in Kant. 
Hanna (2011) argues that there is a gap in Kant’s B-Deduction, because he believes that the ar-
gument of the B-Deduction is only true if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. 
This, according to Hanna, creates a fundamental gap. Further, there is the discussion surround-
ing a so-called gap in the Critical philosophy as a whole between transcendental philosophy and 
empirical science, which concerns a ‘transition’ from the metaphysical foundations of natural 
science to physics proper, addressed by Kant in his Opus postumum. I am concerned with neither 
of these gaps in this paper. For an account of Hanna’s gap, see Schulting 2015. 
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ing, that is, that the categories that we need to think of, experience, or perceive 
objects in fact apply to the objects themselves. This would mean that Kant’s Coper-
nican hypothesis that we take objects to conform to the forms of our understand-
ing, rather than that our concepts conform to the objects (KrV BXVII), is false.³
I contend that a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the analytic prin-
ciple of apperception and the notion of objective validity, and what this entails for 
Kant’s concept of objectivity, underlies this criticism of a supposed gap in Kant’s 
argument. In the following, I address these issues, and shall argue that there is 
in fact no Gap in Kant’s argument. To show that there is no gap between the ana-
lytic principle of apperception and the notion of object that Kant espouses, and 
that Kant indeed shows how subjectivity is constitutive of objectivity, I rehearse 
central arguments regarding the scope of transcendental apperception as a prin-
ciple governing representations from my previous book (Schulting 2012b).
II
So what precisely is the Gap? The main point that is raised is an apparent con-
fusion regarding the necessary application of the categories to experience. It is 
argued (Stephenson 2014: 79) that the fact that
(A) we must apply the categories to experience
doesn’t imply that
(B) we are justified in applying the categories to experience;
alternatively, it is argued (Van Cleve 1999: 89; Gomes 2010) that (A) doesn’t imply 
that
3 It seems that the objection against Kant’s argument simply begs the question against the Co-
pernican hypothesis, for the latter specifically stipulates that the objects must be seen as con-
forming to our understanding, so that our conception of objects is also, in some sense, constitu-
tive of the ‘ontological’ form of objects, i.e. what makes objects be objects. The claim that Kant’s 
argument that the categories are both necessary and sufficient for the knowledge of objects is 
false thus rests on the assumption that the Copernican hypothesis is false. But for the sake of 
delineating the grounds for the Gap, let’s assume the validity of the objection. 
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(C) the categories are instantiated in experience, or indeed apply to objects.⁴ 
The objection is thus that A implies neither B nor C. This constitutes a Gap, for 
Kant does appear to claim that there is an entailment relation between A and B 
and / or between A and C. 
The arguments (A→B) and (A→C) may not at first sight be seen to come down 
to the same thing. There is prima facie good reason to distinguish between them. 
Behind the objection against the entailment between A and B appears to be the 
assumption that some sort of psychological necessity is involved in believing that 
p, without there being necessarily any objective justification for believing that 
p. But the objection seems misplaced, for categories have got nothing to do with 
psychological necessity, or subjective necessity, as Kant calls it at B168, where he 
dismisses the preformation theory of the necessary principles of experience. If it 
is the case that we must apply the categories, then as per Kant’s argument we are 
justified in doing so, because according to Kant the justified employment of the 
categories in experience is precisely concerned with the dual fact that the catego-
ries are the necessary objective conditions of experience of objects and that expe-
rience is possible only if the categories are instantiated in experience. The modal 
condition is not about the putative psychological unavoidability of the categories. 
This brings us to the objection against (A→C), which according to James Van 
Cleve (1999: 89) is often overlooked because of the “easy verbal slide from ‘we 
must apply categories’ to ‘categories must apply’”. This objection goes something 
like this: It might be that the categories are necessary for the conception of objects 
so that they tell us how we truly conceive of objects, but that says nothing about 
whether our conception has any application in reality, in other words, that our 
conception truly corresponds to the objects. The truth of our conceptual scheme 
does not imply the truth about objects. The first concerns an epistemological 
‘fact’ and the second an ontological one, and the realm of epistemological ‘fact’ 
and that of ontological facts shouldn’t be conflated, or so the objection goes. The 
claim here is that Kant argues for the necessary conditions of our conceptual 
scheme only, but fails to show that the categories are actually existentially exem-
plified by the objects of our experience or conception. If true, this would pose a 
real problem for Kant, because it undermines the main claim behind the Coper-
nican hypothesis, namely that the objects themselves conform to our conceptual 
scheme, rather than that we should see our concepts as conforming to pre-given 
objects (KrV BXVI–XVII). 
4 That the categories are instantiated in experience and that they apply to objects is prima facie 
not the same. I discuss this apparent discrepancy further in Sections IV and V below.
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The objection of the Gap is of course a serious charge against Kant, as the very 
goal of the Deduction is to prove that the categories have justified applicability to 
objects in reality, a project Kant specifically positions over against the unjustified 
trust the rationalists placed in the applicability of pure concepts to real objects 
without investigating the warrant for such trust. In other words, the charge of the 
Gap is that Kant’s argument would appear to be as deficient as that mounted by 
the rationalist in securing a connection between concepts and objective reality, 
and that since Kant doesn’t succeed in improving on the rationalists’ attempts, 
his Deduction must be considered a failure.  
In earlier literature (Carl 1989a/b; Guyer 1987, 1992; Mohr 1991; cf. Hoppe 
1983) the Gap has been construed in terms of a non-sequitur between, on the 
one hand, Kant’s argument for the principle of the transcendental unity of apper-
ception (henceforth TUA), in § 16 of the B-edition of the Deduction (henceforth 
the B-Deduction), and on the other hand, his argument for the objective unity 
of apperception (henceforth OUA) in § 17 of the B-Deduction.⁵ The objection in 
this case is that TUA doesn’t imply OUA, against Kant’s claim that it does (§ 18), 
because the conditions for self-consciousness aren’t ipso facto the conditions of 
consciousness of objects. 
I believe that the underlying reason for both construals of the Gap is the 
same, and that both reveal a misunderstanding of the analyticity of the principle 
of apperception, its scope, and its primary role in the constitution of objective 
knowledge. 
III
If we look at Kant’s preliminary conclusion to the first half of the B-Deduction in 
§ 20 (B143) (henceforth “the First Step”), it is prima facie clear that Kant indeed 
claims to have shown that the argument for the necessity of TUA for any unitary 
manifold of representations implies that any such manifold is subject to the cat-
egories, and that, given that categories are concepts of objects in general (B128), 
the very unity of apperception (i.e. TUA) implies the objective unity of conscious-
ness or apperception (i.e. OUA), which is identical to the concept of an object in 
general (B137–8). This ties in with the main claim of the Deduction, namely to 
prove that the subjective conditions of thought are in fact also the objective con-
ditions of possible knowledge (A89–90 / B122), that is, to prove that our represen-
tations are objectively valid, or, genuinely refer and apply to objects.
5 For discussion of this debate, see further Schulting 2012b, Ch. 4.
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Thus the simple implication of Kant’s argument here appears to be that, 
given that the rules for unitary representations are the categories (cf. heading 
B143), and given that the categories define objects in general (B128), the rules for 
unitary representation—i.e. the combined set of rules of synthesis underlying the 
principle of apperception—are the rules for the conception of an object in general 
(cf. A106, A103), but also the rules for objects to be objects (B138); in other words, 
that the principle of apperception is in fact the principle of objective knowledge. 
But why would this follow? Doesn’t this come down to confusing the necessary 
rules for the conception of objects and the sufficient grounds for objective knowl-
edge? 
IV
Before answering these questions, it is important first to note that there is an 
additional apparent problem or at least confusion concerning the very aspect 
of necessity in Kant’s argument. Kant says that categories are necessary condi-
tions of experience (B126, 161, 168; A111). But, as Van Cleve writes, “[w]hat about 
the categories is necessary—their existence, their being used by us, their being 
instantiated by objects, or what?” (1999: 89). Kant says repeatedly that the cat-
egories concern objective validity, that they relate to objects, and that we need 
the categories to think an object. Thus the categories are necessary conditions of 
thinking and of experiencing an object. For example, Kant writes:
[Categories] are related necessarily and a priori to [beziehen … zu] objects of experience, 
since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. (A93 / B126)
Notice that the emphasis here is not on the ‘thinking’ but on ‘object’. As said, 
categories are not psychological conditions. They concern the question of what 
it means to think of an object at all, that is, what it means to first conceive of an 
object. This means that one can’t even speak of there being an object without the 
involvement of the categories, regardless of any question about the rules for expe-
riencing (in the psychological sense) objects. The relation of categories to objects, 
then, includes saying something about how the object is, or, is constituted such 
that I can think it, as indeed Kant writes:
The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not 
merely something I myself need in order to cognize an object but rather something under 
which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me. (B138; emphasis 
added) 
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There is, Kant seems to be claiming, no discrepancy between how, by virtue of 
the synthetic unity of consciousness, I necessarily conceive of the object and the 
object as so conceived. So, given that categories are the set of rules that consti-
tute the synthetic unity of consciousness that is the condition of all cognition, 
categories are not only necessary for objective experience, but also, formally at 
least,⁶ sufficient for it. That is, categories are not only necessary conditions of the 
subjective experience of an object, of how we experience or represent an object at 
all, but they are also the necessary conditions of the objects that we experience. 
Hence, Kant famously writes:
The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of 
the possibility of the objects of experience […]. (B197 / A158)
This conspicuous claim about the entailment relation between the conditions of 
experience and the conditions of the objects of experience is confirmed by the 
following passage in one of the metaphysics lecture notes from the late 1780s: 
All objects of knowledge are objects of experience. Now what is not an object of experience, 
or what has not been given to us through the senses, is also not an object for us. Hence, 
experience is the sum total [Inbegriff] of all our objects. (Met-Schön, 28:476–7; trans. mine)
Kant here suggests that without the categories as conditions of possible experi-
ence there would not be objects for us to experience, which makes the categories 
also ‘ontological’ conditions of objects, but, importantly, not the conditions of “the 
possibility of things in themselves” (Refl 5184, 18:112 [Kant, Notes and Fragments, 
218]).⁷ It is perhaps confusing to speak of the categories as ontological conditions 
of objects, which are not conditions of the possibility of things in themselves, 
when ‘ontological’ is usually understood as having to do with precisely the things 
in themselves (die Sachen selbst, in Kant’s terms). But ‘ontological’ should in the 
first instance be understood as having to do with what instantiates the objects as 
being objects, that is, the intentional accusatives of objectively valid experience 
that are perceived as existing external to oneself. (That the categories are not the 
ontological conditions of things in themselves turns out to be an important qual-
ification for understanding the Gap, or rather, why there is no Gap.)
6 Of course, sensory input is still required.
7 In the quoted lecture note, Kant in fact expresses his doctrine of idealism about the objects of 
experience: experience itself contains all of the objects that can be experienced, none of which 
can be found outside of experience. I discuss this elsewhere (see Schulting 2017a). 
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V
Van Cleve thinks here lies the problem. Kant can be said to confuse or conflate 
into one the following three different modal claims:
(N1) Necessarily, we apply the categories to our judgement about, experience or perception 
of, objects.
(N2) Necessarily, the categories apply to, or are instantiated in, our judgement about, expe-
rience or perception of, objects.
(N3) Necessarily, the categories are exemplified by the objects of our judgement, experi-
ence or perception. 
Taken at face value, N1 does not imply N2, nor is N3 entailed by N2 or N1. It is not 
clear though on what grounds N1 and N2 are indeed validly separable claims, if 
we consider that, for Kant, there is no meaningful distinction between the use of 
categories in judgement, which are in fact nothing but functions of our capacity 
to judge (B143), and their instantiation at least in judgements about objects, if not 
in experience or perception.⁸ While Anil Gomes (2010: 121) differentiates between 
the fact that “we must apply the categories to experience in order to explain the 
unity of consciousness” and the fact that the “categories are actually instanti-
ated in experience”—which appears to map onto the distinction above between 
N1 and N2—he doesn’t at first seem to make the distinction between instantia-
tion of the categories in experience and exemplification of the categories in the 
object of experience, that is, he appears to run together N2 and N3. (That Gomes 
doesn’t in fact run the two together is shown by his proposed solution to the Gap. 
See Section VII.) Van Cleve, on the other hand, seems more straightforward in 
making the distinction between employing the categories in judgement and the 
categories being exemplified in the objects judged about—hence, although the 
wording, used by Gomes (2010:122, et passim), of the distinction “we must apply 
the categories” / “the categories must apply” is his, Van Cleve doesn’t appear to 
distinguish between N1 and N2, but rather between N1 and N3. 
Regarding differentiating between N1 and N2: I pointed out in Section II 
above that if we must apply the categories to our experience of objects (N1), this 
is not because of some psychological requirement on our part, but because cat-
egories are the necessary ingredients of any possible thought or experience of 
objects (N2). On Kant’s definition of experience, the necessary conditions of expe-
8 Of course, the fact that categories are instantiated in judgement doesn’t imply that they are 
instantiated in experience or in the perception of objects. This is why Kant deems it necessary to 
carry out a twofold analysis in the B-Deduction, i.e. the so-called ‘two-step’ argument. 
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rience are reciprocal with our application of those conditions to experience; if 
we didn’t apply the categories to experience of objects, there would not just be 
no categorial experience of objects, but in fact no experience at all. It would thus 
appear that if we must apply the categories to the experience of objects, then the 
categories must apply to, or are instantiated in, the experience of objects. Thus, 
N1 and N2 are not really distinct arguments. Integrating N1 and N2, the amended 
modal claim becomes:
(N1*) Necessarily, the categories are applied (by us), and are thus instantiated, in any judge-
ment about, experience or perception of, objects.
This leaves the putative conflation of N1* and N3, the conflation that Van Cleve is 
worried about and concerns the real contentious issue of the Gap. As these modal 
claims concern, at first sight, an epistemological claim and an ontological one, 
respectively, one would think that N1* and N3 should surely not be confused. For 
it is not, or at least not prima facie, necessarily true that if categories are applied 
and instantiated in our experience, then they are also applied to, or instantiated 
in, the objects of our experience. By claiming, however, that “the conditions of 
the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the pos-
sibility of the objects of experience” (B197 / A158; my underlining), does Kant not 
confuse epistemological and ontological conditions after all, namely, the con-
ditions of experiencing objects and the conditions for objects to be objects for 
us to experience? It may be that we require categories to form rationally coher-
ent beliefs or judgements about objects. As such, categories would be necessary 
conditions for forming such beliefs or judgements, and that such judgements are 
always categorially structured. But that categories are also objectively valid, and 
so are necessary conditions of the objects of experience (and not just the experi-
ence of objects), as Kant claims, requires the additional premise that “any cate-
gories used in judging are actually exemplified by the items judged about” (Van 
Cleve 1999: 89). 
It appears Van Cleve sees the application of categories as analogous to the 
application of empirical concepts in a judgement about objects. The problem that 
he calls attention to is at any rate pertinent in the case of the application of empir-
ical concepts in a judgement. For example, to judge, say,
“This easy chair is a Gispen 407”
doesn’t imply that the chair judged about is actually a Gispen 407, in other words, 
that the property of ‘being a Gispen 407’ is exemplified by the chair that I see in 
front of me and about which I judge that it is a Gispen 407, “for my judgment may 
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not be true” (Van Cleve 1999: 89). I might be fully justified in believing that the 
cantilevered chair I see in front of me is a Gispen 407. But being justified in believ-
ing that p doesn’t imply that p is true. It could be that for all that I believe p to be 
true I am still mistaken. The easy chair I perceive might in fact be another Gisp-
en—a 405, or 412, say—or indeed it might be another type of cantilevered chair 
altogether, a Brno chair, say. It might very well be possible that a deficiency in 
my background knowledge of design chairs prevents me from knowing the truth 
about the chair I perceive. 
So, if we grant the analogy with the application of empirical concepts in a 
judgement, it seems that mutatis mutandis the necessity of applying categories 
in judgements or in experience can’t mean that they are eo ipso objectively valid, 
that is, that they are exemplified by the objects of our experience, for the simple 
reason that a judgement may not be true. Of course, one could reasonably object 
that the application of categories is not analogous to applying empirical con-
cepts, since categories do not feature in the content of a judgement as do empir-
ical concepts, and are not like properties that can be attributed to, and thus be 
exemplified by, objects. This may be true, but is beside Van Cleve’s valid point, 
namely, the critical objection that not every judgement (about an object), in 
which to be sure categories are necessarily instantiated, is ipso facto a true judge-
ment, which our example above made amply clear. In other words, the fact that 
every judgement requires the instantiation of the categories does not make the 
judgement thereby true, so that the categories are also exemplified in the object 
of my judgement. The analogy with the application of empirical concepts is thus 
apt insofar as the necessary employment of categories in our judgements does not 
imply their exemplification in the objects of our judgements—in the same way as 
that the predicative use of empirical concepts in our judgements does not entail 
their exemplification in the objects that our judgements are about—and insofar as 
categories are indeed kinds of property attributed to objects, namely, in the way 
that any empirical object is an instantiation of the concept of an object in general, 
whose intension consists of the set of twelve categories. 
Clearly, any judgement can’t be true just by definition. Van Cleve (1999: 
89–90) considers whether modifying Kant’s claim as instead meaning by the 
objective validity of judgements that only categories used in true judgements are 
true of objects could save Kant’s argument from the criticism that application of 
the categories in judgements doesn’t imply their objective validity. At any rate, 
categories as epistemological conditions of objective experience cannot be onto-
logical conditions of objective experience, that is, conditions that are constitutive 
of the objects of experience, as a matter of course. However, against this sugges-
tion of Van Cleve’s it should be pointed out that if it were the case that only cate-
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gories used in true judgements are true of objects, and that this is what objective 
validity means, then if I made a false judgement, I wouldn’t be able to know that I 
made a false judgement, because it wouldn’t be clear by means of which criterion 
I could differentiate a false judgement from a true judgement.
All in all, it seems fair to say that categories do not guarantee the truth of 
my empirical judgements, and thus that making judgements doesn’t mean that 
they are eo ipso objectively valid. But equally, it seems, the objective validity of a 
judgement is not the same as a judgement having a truth value, i.e. of being either 
true or false. In other words, contrary to what Van Cleve appears to assume, the 
objective validity of the categories must not be confused with truth value or truth 
per se. And by the same token, that a judgement can be true or false doesn’t tell 
us anything about why a judgement is by definition objectively valid, if objective 
validity is indeed the intrinsic character of a judgement, as Kant claims (B142). 
Take for instance the analytic judgement
“Gold is a metal.”
This judgement is true independently of the question of objective validity, that 
is, the question that would be germane in the case of a putative judgement about 
a given golden object, a gold bar, say, to which a property (‘metalness’) were 
attributed. The truth of the analytic judgement “Gold is a metal” entirely depends 
on the analysis of the concepts <gold> and <metal> and on understanding what it 
means that concepts have extensions (and perhaps on having some basic knowl-
edge of metallurgy⁹). The same could mutatis mutandis be said about the false 
judgement
“A table is a chair.”
Objective validity isn’t going to help in determining why this judgement is surely 
false—or in fact, that it is false. Knowing that to judge or state “A table is a chair” 
is to make a false judgement or statement¹⁰ merely and entirely depends on the 
principle of non-contradiction and on understanding the concepts employed in 
it: the judgement or statement “A table is a chair” shows a failure to understand 
9 It could be argued, along Kantian lines, that even the capacity to formulate (and understand) 
analytic judgements relies ultimately on possible experience and empirical knowledge. 
10 Maybe the term ‘statement’ would be more appropriate here, but that makes it even clearer 
that the objective validity of a judgement can’t be identified with its truth value, since also state-
ments that are not judgements strictly speaking have a truth value. See below.
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the very meaning of the concepts <table> and <chair>. The question of objective 
validity is irrelevant here.
Conversely, an objectively valid judgement can equally be false, e.g., the 
judgement “This easy chair is a Gispen 407”, where it is plain for all to see that 
the chair perceptually presented to one, and about which one judges that it is a 
Gispen 407, is in fact not a Gispen 407—that is, the judgement contradicts what 
to all intents and purposes should be clear from perception. The falsity of the 
judgement doesn’t lie in a lack of objective validity though. For if this false judge-
ment were not objectively valid, I wouldn’t even know that my judgement, which 
turns out to be false, is about the very chair perceptually presented to me and 
about which I mistakenly judge that it is a Gispen 407. Moreover, my judgement 
about this chair wouldn’t then just be false, but it wouldn’t in fact be about any 
object at all. To put it succinctly, without objective validity, I wouldn’t be judging 
sensu stricto in the first place (I might be hallucinating, dreaming, or fantasising, 
at best).¹¹ Objective validity, then, appears to be a more fundamental feature of 
judgement than its truth value. It hasn’t got to do just with a judgement being true 
or false, in contrast to what appears to be the majority view among Kantians.¹²
With this in mind, it isn’t germane to ask the question whether I can be mis-
taken about the application of the categories or indeed if the application could be 
“inapt” (Gomes 2010: 125). The application of the categories is not an empirical 
question, dependent on my background knowledge of, in the particular afore-
mentioned case, design chairs, so that I could indeed be mistaken about certain 
properties of the object of my perception. In the case of the categories—which 
are a priori concepts after all—we are, as it were, immune to error through mis-
application, to vary a well-known phrase in the philosophy of mind. Categories 
either apply or they don’t; I can’t be mistaken about my application. That is, when 
I make a judgement about some object o, the categories must apply to o, even if 
I am factually wrong about the empirical content of my judgement. This has to do 
with the fact that categories establish the necessary unity (OUA) that is constitu-
tive of a judgement p, regardless of the question whether p is empirically true or 
11 There is a problem for Kant, as in the Critique of Judgement Kant appears to want to make a 
clear distinction between reflective judgements and determinative judgements, whereby the for-
mer are not objectively valid judgements at all. This conflicts with his claim in the B-Deduction 
that objective validity is an intrinsic element of judgement per se. There is also the issue of his 
Prolegomena distinction between merely subjectively valid judgements of perception and objec-
tively valid judgements of experience. In my view, since judgements of perception lack objective 
validity, and given Kant’s definition for judgement in the B-Deduction (§ 19), they are not really 
judgements. In the limited space of this paper, I cannot elaborate on these important interpre-
tative issues. 
12 But see Vanzo 2012. 
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false. Kant reasons at B141–2 that OUA concerns a necessary unity of represen-
tations in a judgement, whereas the content of judgement is empirical, “hence 
contingent [mithin zufällig]”. The content of a judgement can be true or false, but 
for any determinative judgement p about o OUA is an essential, noncontingent, 
alethically invariant element of judgement. It is this necessary unity, which is the 
same for all judgements about objects regardless of empirical content, that estab-
lishes the objective validity of a judgement. 
So objective validity is not a merely logical condition in the sense of a judge-
ment’s being either true or false (i.e. its having a truth value); that is, it doesn’t, in 
and of itself, concern the truth or falsity of empirical propositions. Rather, objec-
tive validity concerns what Kant calls transcendental truth (B185 / A146), which 
is about the transcendental-logical ‘fact’ that, whenever I judge, either falsely 
or truly, about some object o that it has property F, I’m primordially connected 
with the object of my judgement.¹³ Categories are transcendental conditions of 
objective experience, they are by definition designators of object-intentional-
ity or objectivity; they are not logical conditions of ‘mere’ experience (or ‘mere’ 
thinking). It appears that Van Cleve and Gomes mistake the categories for such 
logical conditions of ‘mere’ experience (or ‘mere’ thinking), as if categories were 
‘merely’ subjective conditions of experience. However, notwithstanding his dis-
missal of Kant’s claim that TUA and the concept of object are intimately related, 
Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism provides a way to avoid 
aforementioned ostensible problems with conflating epistemological and onto-
logical conditions of the experience of objects (I cannot discuss this here, but see 
Schulting 2017a, Chapter 4, Section 4.10).
VI
In earlier literature, mentioned at the end of Section II, there is a slightly different 
take on the putative gap in Kant’s argument. This concerns a reading of the Gap in 
terms of a gap between TUA and OUA. The argument is that there is a gap because 
TUA doesn’t logically imply OUA, contrary to what Kant appears to claim, for TUA 
is a necessary condition of OUA, but not sufficient for it. The unity that is neces-
sary for the connection among my representations to count as my representations 
conjointly is not eo ipso the unity that is necessary for the connection among 
13 Notice that transcendental truth is not a distinct truth from empirical truth, as if there were 
two kinds of truth. Transcendental truth is the necessary (but not the sufficient) condition of 
empirical truth. 
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objective representations, that is, for representations to count as of an object (cf. 
B234–5).
Wolfgang Carl, Paul Guyer and others have noted this (alleged) problem. A 
prima facie valid objection against Kant’s claim that the subjective conditions of 
representations are also objective conditions of knowledge, i.e. the claim that TUA 
entails or is OUA, is that if TUA is not only necessary but also sufficient for objec-
tive experience, as we’ve seen Kant indeed claim (B138), it would seem impossi-
ble to have merely subjective experience that is not already objective experience. 
As Carl (1989a: 96–7) for example has claimed, for Kant to make the claim that 
TUA entails or indeed is OUA he would have had to signal a way in which ‘mere’ 
subjective conditions of experience are “changed” into ones of objective experi-
ence. And to all appearances, Kant fails to do that. TUA neither is OUA, nor does 
TUA imply OUA. So there remains a gap between TUA and OUA.
Let me expand on this a bit. Kant’s claim is that there is an inherent connec-
tion between TUA and OUA, and hence between subjectivity and objectivity, or 
between the subjective conditions of experience (the functions of thought) and 
the objective conditions of experience (the categories), and, as we’ve seen earlier, 
that there is an intimate connection between the conditions of experience and the 
conditions of the objects of experience. That is, the rules for unitary representa-
tion or the categories imply that they are applied to the representation of objects 
and hence, given the definition of object, are exemplified by objects. 
In fact, it seems, Kant defines TUA as OUA. In both the A- and B-edition, Kant 
closely links the unity of consciousness, which unites a manifold of representa-
tions by means of synthesis, with the very possibility of having a concept of some-
thing at all (A103). Hence, at B137 he says that object, as “something in general”, 
is precisely that in whose concept the manifold has been united in consciousness, 
hence is an objective unity of apperception (OUA), and whose concept expresses 
a necessity of synthesis. So the necessity of synthesis that unites a manifold of 
representations is the concept of an object, which is defined by OUA, and this 
is the same synthesis that unites all my representations as mine, and so also 
grounds TUA. Therefore, TUA is OUA because they reduce to the same function of 
unity. This is specifically confirmed by Kant at B139: 
The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all of the mani-
fold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called objective on that 
account, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a 
determination of inner sense, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given 
for such a combination. (my underlining)
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As is clear from this passage, TUA is not the subjective unity of consciousness, as 
some may be inclined to infer from the argument of § 16 of the Deduction, and as 
it seems Carl et al believe on account of their criticism of Kant regarding a gap in 
his central argument. Rather, the subjective unity of consciousness is contrasted 
with the transcendental unity, and is itself merely an empirical, contingent, 
unity, which rests on associations. Lest one think that Kant means by the subjec-
tive unity of consciousness the analytic unity of consciousness of § 16, which is 
established by the ‘I think’ accompanying one’s own representations, in contrast 
to the transcendental unity of consciousness, from B140 it is amply clear that the 
‘I think’ does not concern the subjective unity of consciousness but rather “the 
original unity of consciousness”, or the “pure synthesis” which relates the mani-
fold of representations “to the one I think [zum Einen: Ich denke]”, in other words, 
the transcendental unity of consciousness. The unity referred to in the phrase 
“That unity alone is objectively valid [Jene Einheit ist allein objektiv gültig]” refers 
back to the original-synthetic unity of consciousness that relates the manifold “to 
the one I think [zum Einen: Ich denke]”, and must be contrasted with the “empir-
ical unity of apperception, which we are not assessing here” (B140) and has only 
subjective validity. The subjective unity of consciousness, which is this empirical 
unity of apperception, has therefore nothing to do with the universal and neces-
sary unity of the ‘I think’ of analytic unity of consciousness, which is central to 
the argument of the sections of which the current section (§ 18) is a preliminary 
conclusion. 
To recapitulate: the claim that the transcendental unity of consciousness 
(TUA) is an objective unity of consciousness (OUA) has led to criticism, with 
commentators mostly charging Kant with confusing the necessary condition of 
transcendental apperception for objective representation or the representation of 
objects with a sufficient condition of such representation. But this criticism is, 
I contend, based on a faulty reading of the analyticity of TUA (I analyse this in 
Section VIII below). The reasoning behind the criticism is that it obviously can’t 
be the case that the principle that is responsible for the possibility for a subject 
to have representations, or to represent (TUA), is sufficient to ground the objec-
tive unity of one’s representations (OUA), rather than just the subjective unity of 
consciousness, for it can’t be true that all of my representations are ipso facto 
objective ones. 
But, as I suggested, this criticism is based on an erroneous interpretation of 
TUA. Most commentators read TUA in such a way that it might seem that indeed 
all representations that one has necessarily entail at least the possibility of being 
accompanied by the ‘I think’ and that they are thus united with all other repre-
sentations so accompanied or possibly so accompanied. In that case, if indeed 
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Kant were to claim that TUA is OUA, then all possible representations a subject 
has are at least potentially already objective, and consequently, he would con-
tradict himself, in § 18, by saying that the objective unity of consciousness is not 
a subjective unity of consciousness, which concerns representations that are 
merely subjectively valid, and accidental, hence have nothing to do with a neces-
sary unity of representations. 
Now one could claim—as some, such as Strawson (1968), indeed do—that the 
subjective unity of consciousness is only possible because of an objective unity or 
that the former is dependent on the latter, which is itself again dependent on the 
knowledge of the objective unity among spatiotemporal objects themselves (see 
Schulting 2008). But that is not what Kant is claiming in § 18, where he simply 
and clearly contrasts the two unities, whereby—contrary to Strawson’s perspec-
tive—the subjective unity of consciousness is merely to do with empirical factors, 
whereas the objective unity is in fact the transcendental unity of consciousness, 
i.e. the self-consciousness of apperception, that is first constitutive of objective 
knowledge. 
At any rate, Kant doesn’t claim that any subjective unity of representations is 
governed by an objective or transcendental unity of consciousness, as it would be 
on a Strawsonian reading, even though it would be right to claim that if any man-
ifold of subjective representations were to amount to objective cognition, it would 
be amenable to being brought under TUA. But these are two modally different 
claims, which Kant definitely doesn’t confuse. I shall come back to this important 
aspect below (Section VIII).
To return to Kant’s apparent identification of TUA and OUA, if, as I argued 
before, Kant equates having a concept of an object and grasping the necessity of 
an a priori synthesis that unites a manifold of representations, which also consti-
tutes the existence of an object insofar as its objectivity is concerned—notice: not 
its empirical constitution, which can’t be determined a priori—then the supposed 
gap between categories as concepts of an object in general and their exemplifica-
tion by objects seems to vanish, at least to the extent that the connection between 
categories as constitutive conditions of objectivity is concerned. But Van Cleve 
is not so convinced, and neither is Gomes, who agrees with Van Cleve but has 
come up with a possible rejoinder to Van Cleve’s objection to Kant’s entailment 
claim, namely by resorting to the second half of the B-Deduction (henceforth “the 
Second Step”). This proposal will now be considered. 
Brought to you by | provisional account
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 10/26/17 11:13 AM
104   Dennis Schulting
VII
Gomes (2010) argues that the Gap is first closed by the fact that categories are the 
very rules by means of which objects are given in space, so that in order to be able 
to perceive objects in space, the objects themselves necessitate the exemplifica-
tion of the categories. This would mean that there is in fact no gap between the 
application of the categories and their exemplification in the objects. The objects 
themselves are already given as categorially governed particulars in a spatial con-
tinuum and are as such apprehended by the experiencing and category-applying 
subject. This is first argued in the Second Step, so, in Gomes’s view, it’s only there 
that Kant is able to close the Gap still left open by the argument of the First Step. 
Gomes’s proposal might seem to allay Van Cleve’s worries. But there are 
several problems with his approach. First, there is an interpretative problem 
for Gomes’s proposal. On Kant’s view, objects do not necessitate the instantia-
tion of the categories, as if they were somehow disposed to do so. If categories 
are the necessary rules for the unity of representations, and for the synthesis of 
them, then objects cannot necessitate the instantiation of the categories, for, as 
Kant says, combination or synthesis is not given “through objects” but can only 
be carried out by the subject (B130). Combination cannot be derived from the 
objects, but is an act of the subject only (B134–5). Thus, if the objects themselves 
necessitated the exemplification that the subject of experience can’t achieve by 
itself—namely by applying the categories, and the exemplification of the catego-
ries concerned the necessary and sufficient unification and combination of the 
objects themselves, by these objects themselves, rather than the necessary way in 
which a subject unites and combines representations of objects, then this would 
conflict starkly with Kant’s own thesis that the combination of objects is not a 
function of the objects themselves but exclusively of the subject of experience, 
and thus of judgement. Now this is of course precisely the thesis against which 
Van Cleve and Gomes object: a necessary combination by the subject doesn’t 
suffice for a necessary combination in and among objects.¹⁴ But their criticism 
begs the question against Kant.
Secondly, and more problematically—and this is not just an interpretative 
issue, but poses a philosophical problem that goes to the heart of the Kantian rev-
olution of thought—if indeed the objects themselves necessitated their exempli-
fication and it is not the subject that establishes the exemplification, how could 
I know that the categories are exemplified in an object? For if, as Kant says at 
B138, “an object (a determinate space)” is first recognised by the unity of the act 
14 Cf. Stephenson 2014: 84.
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of apperception or the unity of consciousness (i.e. TUA), then if TUA can’t a priori 
establish the exemplification of the categories in the object (i.e. on account of the 
Gap), I can’t recognise the exemplification that is presumably necessitated in the 
given spatiotemporal object, unless I simply apprehend the categorially struc-
tured object a posteriori by means of perception or there is another kind of a priori 
form of apperception than TUA. But there is no other a priori form of apperception 
and that the apprehension occurs a posteriori is also clearly denied by Kant, for 
necessary connections can’t be just recognised a posteriori:
Combination does not lie in the objects, however, and cannot as it were be borrowed from 
them through perception and by that means first taken up into the understanding, but is rather 
only an operation of the understanding, which is itself nothing further than the faculty of 
combining a priori and bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apper-
ception, which principle is the supreme one in the whole of human cognition. (B134–5; 
emphasis added)
It is, as Kant says in the Second Step, the very TUA, by means of the figurative 
synthesis, not the object or that which is given in sensibility, that ensures that the 
categories are applied in sensibility (B151–2). This does not obviate Kant’s claim, 
in the First Step, that TUA implies OUA, but rather confirms it. At any rate, the 
approach Gomes proposes to allay the worry about the Gap would contravene 
Kant’s Critical turn away from transcendental realism: true knowledge of neces-
sary connections in objects is not based on any putative correspondence of the 
understanding to how things are necessarily structured in themselves or how 
things necessitate their categorialisation, but on how the things necessarily are 
taken to conform to the understanding and its a priori necessary concepts in order 
for knowledge of them to be possible (BXVI–XVII). This concerns not just their 
possible knowledge, but also their ontological constitution as objects of knowl-
edge (in the aforementioned sense of ‘ontological’). 
Thirdly, there is a structural problem with Gomes’s proposal: Given that the 
chief argument of the Second Step is logically dependent on the argument of the 
First Step, if there is a fundamental problem with the First Step, namely the Gap—
more specifically: the gap between (N1*) and (N3)—then the Second Step can’t 
solve it. Whereas the First Step is concerned with the analysis of a general mode 
of discursive categorial cognition dependent on any arbitrary type of sensible 
manifold, the argument of the Second Step concerns a specific application of the 
categories to sensible manifolds that are spatiotemporal, which is characteristic 
of human modes of perception. This is of course not to say that the two-step argu-
ment of the B-Deduction consists just in arguing that the more specific mode of 
cognition treated in the Second Step is simply analytically inferred from the more 
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general mode of cognition discussed in the First Step. Kant must of course show 
how the categories are applied in spatiotemporal sensibility, and this requires an 
additional argument that is not already provided by the First Step, namely, how 
the synthesis of the understanding operates in sensibility itself. My point here 
though is merely that Gomes can’t help himself to a solution to a putatively fun-
damental problem encountered in the First Step, which allegedly invalidates its 
main claim (namely that TUA entails or is OUA), by resorting to the Second Step, 
the chief argument of which relies precisely on that claim for its success, for, as 
Kant argues in the Second Step, the figurative synthesis that enables the cogni-
tion of “a determinate space” (B138), i.e. an empirical object, is nothing but the 
“effect” of the understanding itself in the realm of sensibility (§ 24), and not any 
effect of the exemplification of the categories by the object itself, by merely being 
given. In other words, the fundamental synthetic connection to objects, which 
bridges the putative Gap, should already have been proved in the First Step, with 
the Second Step only explicating how this synthetic a priori connection—the orig-
inal-synthetic unity of apperception—has purchase in sensibility itself. 
VIII
To return to Van Cleve’s objection (addressed in Section V), as I suggested earlier 
I think that the main problem lies in how Van Cleve (and following him, Gomes) 
reads TUA. It’s a common reading, which commits one to a particularly strong 
modal interpretation of the principle of apperception. I contend that the principle 
of apperception should be taken in a different, modally more moderate sense. The 
strong modal reading of the principle of the unity of apperception says, roughly:
TUA = Necessarily, all representations of which I am conscious are subject to the unifying 
act of apperception.
This definition of TUA is problematic, for it glosses over salient aspects of the 
principle of apperception. More bluntly, it reads too much into the principle.
The principle of apperception, i.e. the principle expressed in the proposition 
“the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations”, advanced at the 
start of § 16, does specifically not state that, necessarily, for every instance of a 
representation r there is an actual or potential instance of self-consciousness or a 
self-aware agent S, so that r is eo ipso unified with all other representations repre-
sented, potentially or actually, by S. That would be a rather immodest claim, but 
it would also contravene several of Kant’s statements regarding the possibility of 
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representations or even instances of consciousness which the representer R is not 
reflexively aware of having (e.g. the representations had by infants, who are not 
yet able to employ the very concept of ‘I’; cf. Anth § 1). It would be odd to claim 
that on the grounds of occurrent representations not being accompanied by the 
‘I think’ (that is, represented by S), by implication R does not represent, or, is not 
in some non-transcendentally-conscious sense minimally aware of the represen-
tations it has. Stressing the necessary potentiality of apperception doesn’t help 
here, for infants represent without ever apperceiving their representing, so that 
for them there is not even a potentiality of apperception.
On a more moderate reading, the principle of apperception states that for any 
representation r to be part of the set of all my representations, it must be part of 
the set of representations that are conjointly accompanied by my identical self as 
the agent of representing, by means of an analytic unity of consciousness, which 
is common to all the representations accompanied by the same self. This reading 
is in line with the criterial principle expressed at B138:
[A]ll my representations in any given intuition must stand under the condition under which 
alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and thus can grasp 
them together, as synthetically combined in an apperception, through the general expres-
sion ‘I think’. (Kant’s emphasis)
Notice that Kant puts emphasis on the indexical ‘my’. The reciprocity, or analytic 
unity, that is expressed by the principle of apperception lies between the index-
ical ‘I’ of the act of apperception and the ‘my’ as the indexical contained in the 
accompanied manifold of representations. This makes sense, as the only repre-
sentations that ‘I’ ever accompany will be ‘my’ representations, not yours, hers, 
or x’s, not even those that happen to be occurrent in my head, but to which I do 
not currently direct my attention.¹⁵ The moderate reading of apperception can be 
defined thus:
15 Cramer (1990: 179) points to a potential ambiguity regarding the indexical ‘my’ here: does 
Kant mean by “all my representations” those representations that I represent as mine by first ac-
companying them (by means of the ‘I think’) or those representations ‘in me’, which I do not yet 
represent as mine? It seems that Cramer reads the ‘in me’ possessively in contrast to an epistemic 
reading of the indexical ‘my’ (the possessive / epistemic terminology is owed to Ameriks 2000). 
However, despite Kant’s own misleading use of the verb gehören at B134, I believe that the pos-
sessive reading is inapposite in regard to the indexical ‘my’ in “all my representations”, since the 
mineness of representations ‘in me’ cannot be determined before accompanying them, as Kant 
himself indeed affirms (B134). No representation is ‘mine’ sensu stricto, and so belongs to me in 
the strict sense, before I accompany it as mine. The fact that representations are ‘in me’ (whereby 
‘me’ should here be taken sensu latiori) does not eo ipso make them ‘my’ representations, in the 
strict sense which I take Kant to mean here in § 16 of the B-Deduction, unless I so take them. By 
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TUA* = A representation r is accompanied by subject S if and only if r is analytically united 
with all representations that have the same relation to S and S accompanies these represen-
tations conjointly, for which a certain condition of combining must be fulfilled. 
The condition of combining mentioned in the above definition, as well as in the 
passage at B138, is the condition of a priori synthesis, which is the explaining 
ground of the analytic principle TUA* (cf. B135). For the purpose of this paper, it is 
not necessary to expand on the contentious topic of a priori synthesis here,¹⁶ and 
at any rate Van Cleve and Gomes are not oblivious of its importance. 
What needs emphasising here, is that TUA* is not to be considered a prin-
ciple governing all the representing that is going on in one’s mind at any one 
time, for it is not a psychological principle. Nor is it the case that there is a rela-
tion of necessary entailment between any given representation and transcenden-
tal apperception, so that any representation is at least potentially accompanied 
by transcendental apperception.¹⁷ This last approach seems perhaps the most 
natural reading of apperception—or at least, it seems to best capture the phrase 
“must be able” in the ‘I think’-proposition. However, it runs up against multi-
ple interpretative and philosophical problems. For one thing, it makes the rather 
intemperate metaphysical claim that representations, qua representations, have 
built into them some sort of disposition to being accompanied by the ‘I think’, or 
can be analysed conceptually to have an inbuilt element of transcendental apper-
ception. But Kant never claims that the Deduction is concerned with a principle 
of representation or mere consciousness or tries to argue for some sort of teleo-
logical conatus pervading the mind’s representational capacity. This is crucial to 
be mindful of, as it helps us understand Kant’s central claim that transcendental 
apperception is an objectively valid condition of experience, and not a principle 
of mere experience (taken in a psychological sense of mere representing or mere 
consciousness). 
That transcendental apperception is not a principle of first-order represent-
ing or consciousness is, I believe, also borne out by Kant’s distinction between 
transcendental (TUA*) and empirical apperception (EA). EA, which he also calls 
inner sense (A107), is intrinsically variable—inner sense is the natural human 
psychological disposition in which the representations prompted in the mind 
vary across the time in which they are prompted. Inner sense cannot provide 
the subsistence on the basis of which the cognition of something substantial 
implication, it is not necessary that all representations ‘in me’ are therefore accompanied or even 
be able to be accompanied by me (the ‘I think’). 
16 For extensive analysis, see Schulting 2012b.
17 In Schulting 2012a I called this reading of apperception NER or the variant NER′.
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and stable, an object (a phaenomenon substantiatum [Refl 4421–2, 17:540]) that 
is represented as external to my consciousness, is possible. Only transcendental 
apperception provides the invariance that is necessary for objectively valid cog-
nition of an object as a phaenomenon substantiatum. Often it is thought that tran-
scendental apperception just is the necessary principle of EA, but that doesn’t 
make sense: if transcendental apperception is the criterion for stability and EA 
signals precisely the opposite, i.e. a flux of representations that is in itself unsta-
ble (A107), then transcendental apperception can’t be the necessary condition of 
EA simpliciter. Something that secures stability can’t be the necessary condition 
of something that is essentially instability.
But of course Kant doesn’t at all claim that just any manifold of representa-
tions is governed by transcendental apperception, even though it would be right 
to claim that if any given manifold of representations (accompanied by EA) were 
to amount to objectively valid cognition, it would be amenable to being brought 
under TUA*, and so under that condition EA would be governed by TUA*. The 
modality of the ‘I think’ proposition lies in the hypothetical condition under 
which representations are accompanied by the ‘I think’, which avoids intemper-
ate modal claims such as expressed by TUA. In contrast to TUA, TUA* allows that 
some representations are ‘merely’ subjective, do not refer to objects (either inner 
or outer objects), and hence are not objectively valid. TUA* must be distinguished 
strictly from the “subjective unity of consciousness” (B139). Hence, TUA* has a 
much smaller scope than TUA. 
TUA* is the principle governing manifolds of representations that are accom-
panied jointly by an identical ‘I’ and only if an ‘I’ accompanies them. The identity 
of the accompanying ‘I’ and the unity of the accompanied manifold are recip-
rocal, in the sense of the occurrent representer R being the representer of that 
manifold only which it actually accompanies (cf. B132; see further below Section 
IX). This doesn’t mean that representations, just any, must be accompanied by 
the ‘I think’, or even must be able to be accompanied by the ‘I think’—not all 
Rs are S’s. Indeed this is what distinguishes TUA* from TUA, which does make 
that intemperate claim. Instead, the ‘I think’ proposition states that the ‘I think’ 
must be able to accompany “all my representations” (as a unified manifold), 
implying that if (and only if) “all my representations” are accompanied, they are 
accompanied by an actual ‘I think’. The distinction between TUA and TUA* is one 
between, respectively, claiming that
(R)  All representations must be accompanied by an ‘I think’ 
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or, alternatively, to stress, not the necessity, but the necessary potentiality of 
being apperceived:
(R*) All representations must be able to be accompanied by an ‘I think’
and claiming that
(T) The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations
or, more clearly stated,
(T*) Necessarily, if there is an ‘I think’, then it accompanies all my representations.
Only (T / T*) is true. Notice again that Kant does not state
(T**) The ‘I think’ must accompany all my representations
that is,
(T***) Necessarily, the ‘I think’ accompanies all my representations
for this suggests that the ‘I think’ is necessarily existentially instantiated, which 
is of course not the case.
From the above, it is clear, then, that I am not always already reflectively 
aware of all the possible representations that I have (are “in me”¹⁸), implying that 
it is not necessarily the case that for all possible representations that one has (are 
“in me”) an ‘I think’ is existentially instantiated, and nor is it true that the ‘I think’ 
is necessarily instantiated at all—think of someone who is in a permanent near 
vegetative or at the most subcognitive minimally conscious comatose state, for 
whom the ‘I think’ is never existentially instantiated. By writing “must be able” 
Kant indicates that a modal condition is concerned which signals a conditional 
necessity: if there is an ‘I think’, an ‘I’ reflecting on her representations, then she 
must accompany her representations (i.e. “all my representations” conjointly).¹⁹ 
18 See again note 15 above.
19 For a more expansive account of transcendental apperception, see Schulting 2012b and 
Schulting 2017b. 
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IX
TUA* is thus not a principle of mere representation, that is, of representing any 
given discrete manifold of representations. The scope of TUA* is limited to “all 
my representations”, and does not range over all possible representations. This 
means that I am aware only of my representations as unified by my actually 
accompanying them for each possible existential instantiation of ‘I’ thought; I 
am not ipso facto aware of all possible representations severally as they occur 
or might occur in the mind (“in me”), since my ‘I think’ is not ipso facto instanti-
ated for each instance of representing (representing and thinking are not the same 
thing, nor does the former necessarily entail the latter). That is, TUA* asserts the 
principle of the self taking a manifold of representations as a unity of representa-
tions “for” herself (B132). There is a necessary reciprocity between the self taking 
her representations as hers and those representations as so represented, that is, 
taken as hers, by the same identical self. This ‘taking as’ is transcendental apper-
ception. Transcendental apperception is not about representations being apper-
ceived as a matter of course, just by sheer representing. The reciprocity between 
the self taking her representations as hers and those representations as so repre-
sented is asserted by Kant in the first paragraph of § 16:
Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in 
which this manifold is to be encountered. (B132; emphasis added) 
Furthermore, TUA* is not a principle merely of thought, but of thinking the 
content of thought, the content minimally being the unitary manifold that is 
accompanied by the ‘I think’. This is what one could call the inherent ‘about-
ness’ of thought. Thought is not merely occurrent representing or just mental 
stuff that supervenes on the brain, or indeed some internal, mental muttering to 
oneself. Thought is intrinsically about something, at least a unitary determinate 
manifold in general (the “all my representations” conjointly), which I take to be 
‘my’ content, whatever the content may be in empirical terms.²⁰ This is what Kant 
means by OUA. The objective unity of my representations concerns the unitary 
manifold of representations that I take, apperceive, to be my representations, my 
thought content. 
20 One might believe that to think a concept is to think something merely general, the concept 
of <red>, say, but even here there is content, i.e. the content being the logical content of what 
constitutes the concept <red>, namely <the colour at the end of the spectrum next to orange and 
opposite violet>. The content of my thought is then the logical content of the concept that I think. 
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But the objective unity of representations (i.e. OUA) is not just my thought 
content, as if it concerned a mere subjective, accidental array of whatever goes 
on in my head without any reference to something outside the standpoint of my 
thought, outside my perspective. The content of my thought is taken by me to be 
something for me: that is, it is an object of some kind for me. The ‘object’ here is 
the relatum of one’s taking one’s representations as one’s own, namely the man-
ifold of representations as so represented. It is in this sense that the determinate 
relations in which representations stand to each other by virtue of the categories 
as rules of synthesis among them,²¹ which constitute what it means to apperceive 
one’s representations as one’s own (TUA*), are constitutive of the concept of an 
object in general, where concept, for Kant, is a function defined as “the unity 
of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” (B93 
/ A68; cf. A103) and object is “that in the concept of which the manifold of a 
given intuition is united” (B137). This object can be an internal object (in cases of 
self-knowledge),²² but for Kant’s purposes in the Critique, it predominantly con-
cerns an external object.
The ‘subjective’ conditions under which I apperceive representations as “all 
my representations” conjointly are thus at the same time the objective conditions 
of thought, namely the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be 
an object for me (assuming something is given in sensibility), in abstraction from 
what that ‘something’ is further determined to be empirically (cf. B158 [3:123.16–
19]). This conception of an object is of course only a very general concept of an 
object, of how I take something to be an object for me, whatever further deter-
minations are attributable to it. OUA is therefore only constitutive of the most 
general predicates of objects (their substance, causal relations, etc.), not of their 
empirical properties. It concerns the transcendental truth conditions of object 
knowledge, which are not merely logical or epistemological conditions of knowl-
edge, but just as much the ontological conditions of knowledge, that is, the con-
stitutive conditions of the objects of knowledge (though, it should be noted again, 
not the ontological conditions of things in themselves).  
I think it is clear on the basis of the above analysis that, against the view of 
Van Cleve, Gomes and others, it can be asserted that there is no ‘in principle’ 
gap between the subject of thought or the categories of experience or TUA*, on 
the one hand, and OUA, or the exemplification of the categories in the object, on 
21 Notice that categories are nothing but “kinds of unity of consciousness” (Refl 5854, 18:370). 
Cf. Met-Schön, 28:472, 482; Met-Vigilantius 29:978–9 and Prol §  22, 4:305. For discussion, see 
Schulting 2012b: 83ff.
22 See Schulting 2017b.
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the other. Hence, there is no Gap in the First Step that requires bridging, by for 
example having recourse to the Second Step, as Gomes (2010) proposes.
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